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The Loya Jirga, Ethnic Rivalries and Future Afghan Stability 
by Thomas H. Johnson 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
August 6, 2002 
On June 24 the Afghan transitional government and administration of Hamid Karzai was installed during 
formal ceremonies in Kabul. Karzai had easily won the June 13 election at a national political assembly, 
or loya jirga. The loya jirga consisted of 1500 representatives, elected or appointed from 32 provinces, 
and debated the political future of Afghanistan over a seven-day period. 
The Karzai government is supposed to rule Afghanistan through 2003. During the ceremony, Karzai and 
his new cabinet took an oath in both major Afghan languages (Pashtu and Dari), vowing to "follow the 
basic teachings of Islam" and the laws of the land, to renounce corruption, and to "safeguard the honor 
and integrity of Afghanistan."[1] How successful they are in achieving these vows will be critical to the 
near term future of Afghanistan, its reconstruction, and possibly the stability of the entire region of Central 
Asia.  
This transitional government was the result of an Emergency Loya Jirga and part of the Bonn Agreement 
(of November-December 2001). While not explicitly stating so in the Bonn Agreement, Lakhdar Brahimi, 
the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General suggested that the role of the Emergency Loya 
Jirga after six months was to remedy some of the defects of the interim government originally chosen at 
Bonn. One such defect was that the original interim government did not closely reflect the demographics 
of the country. 
Bonn Meeting 
The Bonn meeting was an internationally brokered conference, heavily influenced by the United States, 
that brought together four of the major Afghan factions -- the Northern Alliance (primarily Tajik), the Rome 
group loyal to former king Zahir Shah, and the smaller Cyprus Group (Iran-backed) and Peshawar Front 
(Pakistan-based and primarily Pashtun) exile groups.[2] After nine days of intensive negotiations and deal 
making, the Afghan groups signed an agreement aimed at establishing a transitional government for 
Afghanistan.  
Pashtun tribal leader Karzai was chosen to serve as head of an interim power-sharing council, which took 
office in Kabul on December 22. Karzai was clearly the U.S. favorite for this position. Especially after the 
Taliban's assassination of Abdul Haq last fall, Karzai was the one Pashtun leader with whom the United 
States felt comfortable. Washington lobbied vigorously in Bonn to secure Karzai's position as the leader 
of the Afghan transitional government.[3]  
While some radical Arabs view Karzai as a U.S. puppet, the Afghan leader has been willing to criticize 
U.S. actions that he has not viewed favorably. Karzai's relative independence from the United States has 
been seen recently in his critical statements concerning the deadly U.S. air strikes on several Pashtun 
villages in Uruzgan. 
The results of the Bonn Conference saw the Northern Alliance, which has controlled Kabul since the 
defeat of the Taliban, receiving the three most powerful ministries. Younis Qanooni, who led the Northern 
Alliance's delegation, was made interior minister, while alliance commander-in-chief General Mohammad 
Fahim got the Defense Ministry and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah retained his position as foreign secretary. The 
30-member cabinet included 11 Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five from the Shi'a Hazara population, and three 
Uzbeks, with the rest drawn from other minorities.  
Northern Alliance cabinet members appointed by the Bonn Meeting were primarily ethnic Tajiks and 
former militia leaders from the Panjshir Valley -- base of the famed Afghan resistant leader Ahmed Shah 
Massoud who was assassinated on September 9, 2001. Since the defeat of the Taliban these Panjshiris 
have dominated the Afghan security forces. 
One could rightfully argue that neither the Bonn meeting nor the government it chose was very 
representative of the demographics and traditional power centers in Afghanistan. In particular, relatively 
few Pashtuns were given seats of power.[4] Pashtuns expected this imbalance to be corrected in the 
Emergency Loya Jirga, with Karzai shifting the balance of power back their way and giving the former 
king a prominent national role. This did not happen. 
Emergency Loya Jirga and Resulting Transitional Government 
The Bonn agreement called on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional 
administration, "to lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected", 
no later than two years from the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. The Emergency Loya Jirga was 
also to elect a Head of State for the transitional administration.[5]  
The main issues concerning government composition of the Emergency Loya Jirga turned out to be the 
role of the former king -- Zahir Shah -- and his representatives as well as the role of the Panjshiris who 
since the defeat of the Taliban have controlled most of the Afghan security services in and near Kabul. 
Both of these issues were resolved in rather interesting ways.  
Once the former king gave his support for the election of fellow Pashtun Karzai as the Afghan head of 
state, ethnic issues seemed somewhat diffused as subjects such as religion, the role of parliament, 
stability, and economic development dominated the jirga debates. This diffusion of ethnic suspicions and 
rivalry, however, was short lived.  
The Makeup of Afghanistan's New Government and Cabinet 
President Hamid Karzai Pashtun 
Deputy Presidents Mohammed Fahim Tajik 
  Karim Khalili Hazara 
  Abdul Qadir Pashtun 
Special Advisor on Security Yunus Qanooni Tajik 
Cabinet Position     
Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim Tajik 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Tajik 
Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani Pashtun 
Interior Minister Taj Mohammed Wardak Pashtun 
Planning Minister Mohammed Mohaqik Hazara 
Communications Minister Masoom Stanakzai Pashtun 
Borders Minister Arif Nurzai Pashtun* 
Refugees Minister Intayatullah Nazeri Tajik 
Mines Minister Juma M. Mahammadi Pashtun 
Light Industries Minister Mohammed Alim Razm Uzbek 
Public Health Minister Dr. Sohaila Siddiqi Pashtun 
Commerce Minister Sayed Mustafa Kasemi Shiite Muslim 
Agriculture Minister Sayed Hussain Anwari Hazara 
Justice Minister Abbas Karimi Uzbek 
Information and Culture 
Minister Saeed Makhdoom Rahim Tajik 
Reconstruction Minister Mohammed Fahim Farhang Pashtun 
Haj and Mosques Minister Mohammed Amin Naziryar Pashtun 
Urban Affairs Minister Yusuf Pashtun Pashtun 
Public Works Minister Abdul Qadir Pashtun 
Social Affairs Minister Noor Mohammed Karkin Turkman 
Water and Power Minister Ahmed Shakar Karkar Uzbek 
Irrigation & Environment 
Minister Ahmed Yusuf Nuristani Pashtun 
Martyrs and Disabled Minister Abdullah Wardak Pashtun 
Higher Education Minister Sharif Faez Tajik 
Civil Aviation & Tourism 
Minister Mir Wais Saddiq Tajik 
Transportation Minister Saeed Mohammed Ali Jawad Shiite 
Education Minister Yunus Qanooni Tajik 
Rural Development Minister Hanif Asmar Pashtun 
Courts     
Supreme Court Chief Justice Sheikh Hadi Shinwari   
 
* but from a Tajik-dominated party 
Source: The Associated Press, 22 June 2002 
The most problematic and sensitive appointments were in the area of security. Karzai renamed 
Mohammed Fahim, a leader of the Northern Alliance forces based in the Panjshir Valley, as defense 
minister.[6] He also appointed Fahim as one of three vice-presidents, strengthening his position. This 
move was a clear indication of the power of the Tajiks as well as the Northern Alliance and signaled 
Karzai's acceptance of the Panjshiris as necessary partners in his militarily weak government. Karzai 
discovered he could not keep stability in a fragile situation without the help of powerful factional leaders 
such as Fahim. However, this relationship between Karzai and Fahim is quickly becoming contentious 
and has the potential to bring down the Transitional Government. 
For all practical purposes there was only one key change in the cabinet resulting from the loya jirga -- the 
departure of interior minister Yunus Qanooni, a Tajik. Qanooni played a key role during the Bonn Meeting 
in initially securing support for Karzai's candidacy among leaders of a powerful, Tajik-led political and 
military coalition. 
The dismissal of Qanooni was met with considerable controversy. When Karzai announced he would 
replace Qanooni at the powerful interior ministry with Taj Mohammed Wardak, an elderly governor and 
ethnic Pushtun, Panjshiri soldiers and policemen in the ministry initially resisted the change with 
roadblocks and work stoppages. Karzai, recognizing the implications of alienating the Tajiks as well as 
the reality of the considerable military strength of the Northern Alliance and especially the Panjshiris, 
eventually resolved the "crisis" by appointing Qanooni as adviser for internal security, a newly created 
post, as well as minister of education.[7] 
Fahim, Qanooni and Ahmad Wali Massoud are all vying for the leadership of the Panjshiris (Shura-i 
Nazar), and relations among them reportedly are not good. The demands by Pashtuns that their power 
should be reduced exacerbated relations in particular between Fahim and Qanooni. Karzai has been 
caught in the middle of this. The basic reality is that, were it not for the U.S. and coalition presence, the 
Panjshiris could replace Karzai anytime they wanted, and a lot of them are chafing under the constraints 
of a coalition. If push comes to shove, we could witness an expansion of ethnically based Afghan conflicts. 
Karzai's choice of cabinet members also clearly represents a compromise between stability and change. 
Many Pashtuns expected that he would make major changes to the cabinet chosen during the Bonn 
Meeting by removing factional leaders and appointing a balanced and professional cabinet more in line 
with the desires of the Pashtun community. Ultimately, this proved to be an impossible task because the 
leaders of the Northern Alliance were less than accommodating to change that would diffuse the 
considerable power they received from the Bonn Meeting. The current cabinet reflects Karzai's 
recognition of the importance of striking a balance between the Pashtuns and Tajiks. Karzai is intimately 
aware of this after leading Afghanistan's interim government for six months in an uneasy partnership with 
leaders from the Tajik-led Northern Alliance. He has been faced with an extremely difficult task of 
assembling an administration that would satisfy all major ethnic groups while meeting the country's 
desperate need for professional governance after years of ruinous conflict. 
The composition of the cabinet also suggests that the Pashtuns remain disorganized and lacking 
leadership acceptable to broader groups. Considering that Kabul has traditionally been ruled by Pashtuns, 
we are witnessing a shift in traditional power relationships very different from what we have witnessed in 
the past. But then again, alliances and ideologies are impermanent, which is one reason Afghanistan has 
had nothing resembling a stable central government for much of its existence. Nevertheless, the Tajik-
dominated Northern Alliance has recognized their ability to achieve practical superiority against the 
Pashtuns who are superior in numbers and who had held them at bay for years.  
Ultimately the key issue is, how will this government govern? What will it do? If the government delivers, it 
is hoped that people will not worry as much about the ethnic identity of the ministers. If the government 
fails to fulfill the wishes of the people, then the assertions of ethnic identity have a greater potential to 
create conflict.  
In the end it appears that the loya jirga's main achievement was to give legitimacy to Hamid Karzai's 
transitional government -- an end-state seemingly consistent with the desires of the United States and 
other international actors. Stability in Afghanistan is going to be a difficult goal to accomplish, especially 
with the continued ethnic rivalries that are clearly reflected in the Afghan Transitional Government and 
Cabinet. 
Alienated Pashtuns?  
This new power of the Tajiks has not sat well with the Pashtuns and has alienated many in Karzai's 
critical Pashtun power base. While former King Zahir Shah was named by Karzai as "Father of the 
Nation," many Pashtuns were dismayed and angered that none of his aides had been given senior 
posts.[8] Other than Karzai, very few Pashtuns hold positions of power in the Afghan cabinet. In July, a 
Washington Post article titled "Pashtuns Losing Faith in Karzai, U.S."[9] suggested that the Pashtuns are 
"becoming rapidly disillusioned by a series of developments that have reinforced the power of rival ethnic 
Tajiks and militia leaders, left the former king politically sidelined and a Pashtun vice president 
assassinated, and subjected Pashtun villages to lethal U.S. air attacks."[10]  
Pashtuns reportedly do not feel welcomed in Kabul where the officials that they see do not speak Pashtu. 
Padsha Khan Zadran, a powerful Pashtun leader/warlord in the important Khost Province[11] sums up the 
sentiments of many Pashtuns when he asks, "Why are they humiliating Pashtuns? We're the majority. 
They placed Hamid Karzai at the top as a representative of Pashtuns. But in reality he's no longer a 
Pashtun. He's sold himself out. He's a traitor. Pashtuns cannot sit around waiting. They will react and will 
claim their rights."[12]  
Zadran has already mobilized his supporters against the Karzai government. His supporters have 
demonstrated in Khost calling for Karzai's resignation as well as blocking the roads leading from Khost to 
Kabul. Zadran also wants his local power recognized by an official position in the Afghan Government. In 
response to such actions, it is reported that Karzai is considering the use of military action against Zadran. 
Last Sunday, Karzai issued a statement calling Zadran and his group of supporters a "group of bandits." 
Karzai further warned that the military may be "forced to take any actions deemed necessary to keep 
peace and stability."[13] 
If Karzai does take military action against Zadran it could precipitate a larger crisis for his administration. It 
would signal a military action against a fellow Pashtun and would be Karzai's first attempt to explicitly 
exert the government's influence and control outside of Kabul. This could have disastrous consequences 
for Karzai if other warlords who are in firm control view such actions as a threat against their own 
respective regions. The warlords might explicitly rise up against his regime. 
It must be remembered that the central governments have traditionally been weak and have had little real 
control in the hinterland of Afghanistan. The characterization of Afghanistan by the 19th century British 
diplomat Sir Henry Rawlinson -- as "consist[ing] of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and 
divergent habits, which are held together more or less closely, according to the personal character of the 
chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as it is known in Europe, cannot exist among Afghans, for 
there is no common country" -- is still true today and suggests critical challenges for any central 
government in Kabul.  
Continued Pashtun and Tajik Rivalry 
It appears that the distrust between the Pashtuns and Tajiks will continue to dominate the politics of 
Afghanistan and in so doing make the achievement of a positive peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan 
much more difficult. Indeed the question of the Karzai government either succeeding or succumbing will 
be in large part a function of this long-standing ethnic rivalry. This has been clearly witnessed in the last 
few weeks as Karzai has taken several unexpected steps to challenge the rule over the military by Fahim 
and his fellow Panjshiris. An indignant Fahim has met Karzai's insistence that Fahim reduce the numbers 
and influence of the Panjshiris in the Defense Ministry and replace them with non-Tajiks.[14] 
Observers suggest that Karzai's recent replacement of his Defense Ministry Guards with U.S. Special 
Forces is a clear sign that Karzai doubts the loyalty of Fahim and his fellow Tajiks. The Washington Post 
reports that "officials close to [Karzai] say they fear that the growing tension [between Fahim and Karzai] 
could lead to violent reprisals against the president, whose political base remains weak and whose 
authority barely extends beyond Kabul."[15] The Post quotes an Afghan deputy minister who is close to 
Karzai as stating, "For six months Fahim dictated to Karzai, and he was the most powerful man in 
Afghanistan. Now he is worried that may change. The President has gotten [foreign] protection now, but I 
still think he is in danger. Fahim and his friends are warlords, and you cannot make peace out of them. If 
the situation remains as it is, I think we are headed back to civil war."[16]  
A renewed civil war would be absolutely disastrous for Afghanistan where there has been constant violent 
civil strife for the last 25 years. Yet the signs seem to be pointing in this direction. Fahim and his fellow 
Tajik Panjshiris believe that their five-year struggle with the Taliban has secured their right to rule 
Afghanistan. After all, it was their Northern Alliance who drove the Taliban from Kabul -- of course with a 
tremendous U.S air campaign. They will not play a secondary role to the Pashtuns or anybody else. 
If the Panjshiris do replace Karzai with one of their Tajik own, it will only be the third time in Afghan history 
that a Pashtun was not at the head of the national government in Kabul.[17] If such an event occurs the 
chances of a civil war will be nearly certain, even considering the relative lack of Pashtun unity we are 
presently witnessing. 
The turmoil in Kabul is echoed in the provinces and hinterland where recent weeks have witnessed an 
intensification of Pashtun and Tajik conflict as ethnic warlords battle one another. As Kabul's weak central 
government seeks to impose law and order and to control potential tax revenues in Afghanistan, warlord 
rivalries have flared into violence in northern, eastern and western areas of the country among armed 
factions reluctant to surrender their own share of power and local wealth.  
This dynamic is clearly evident in the western city of Herat where there have been reports of heavy 
fighting between ethnic Tajik and Pashtun militias.[18] Here Tajik fighters under Herat's provincial 
governor, Ismail Khan,[19] have been fighting militia of a rival Pashtun commander, Ammanullah Khan. 
Pashtuns are a minority in this area and they have complained bitterly of looting and oppression by Ismail 
Khan's armed followers. This combined with the feelings by Pashtuns that they are underrepresented in 
top positions in a central government dominated by minority Tajiks have made this region as well as 
others explosive power kegs. Such rivalries have the potential to embroil all of Afghanistan. 
Conclusion  
It is unrealistic to expect that Karzai's government in Kabul will have much significant control in the short 
term over regional and local power relationships that have long dominated. Kabul can serve a useful 
mediating role in conflicts at the regional level, but that is about all that can realistically expected. The 
same holds true for reconstruction. Kabul with the international community can help to create blueprints 
for the development of educational, health, and commercial infrastructures, but the specific construction 
must be based on the specific needs and peculiarities of the locale or region. 
The fragmentation and complexity of Afghanistan will continue to present challenges to reconstruction as 
well as to the vision of a peaceful, stable post-Taliban country free of terrorists. To understand 
Afghanistan, one must recognize and be sensitive to the fact that group identities and power relationships 
as well as coalitions are based on ethno-linguistic affinities.  
This being said, it is extremely important that the United States and the international community not walk 
away from Afghanistan. If they do, they risk the same type of blowback experienced after the United 
States walked away in 1990 following the Soviets' withdrawal across the Amu Darya. Afghanistan is in 
need of massive political and economic reconstruction, but any international effort must recognize the 
realities of the local situation. If nuances such as ethno-linguistic fragmentations are not recognized, then 
political stability and reconstruction programs are unlikely to succeed.  
If Afghanistan is not at least moderately reconstructed the odds of it again becoming a haven for terrorists 
are greatly magnified. Ultimately, the cost of Afghan reconstruction is a timely and cost effective 
investment that will pay for itself over the long turn. The alternatives will be much more costly in terms of 
instability and conflict. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our South Asia Resources. 
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